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Interpretation of animal behavior, especially as cooperative or selfish, is a challenge for evolution-
ary theory. Strategy of a competition should follow from corresponding Darwinian payoffs for the
available behavioral options. The payoffs and decision making processes, however, are difficult to
observe and quantify. Here we present a general method for the derivation of evolutionary payoffs
from observable statistics of interactions. The method is applied to combat of male bowl and doily
spiders, to predator inspection by sticklebacks and to territorial defense by lions, demonstrating
animal behavior as a new type of game theoretical equilibrium. Games animals play may be de-
rived unequivocally from their observable behavior, the reconstruction, however, can be subjected
to fundamental limitations due to our inability to observe all information exchange mechanisms
(communication).
PACS numbers:
Animals in the wild or laboratory environment are in-
volved in coordinated, game-like interactions. It can be
a fight for mating opportunities with basic individual
choices to attack or retreat, or cooperation vs. selfish-
ness dilemma such as participation in territory defence
or predator inspection. The corresponding Darwinian
rewards and costs are significant, exacting even the life
of a player. Animal behavior in these contests, therefore,
must be affected by natural selection, converging with
time to some evolutionary optimum.
Modeling of animal behavior in the framework of evo-
lutionary game theory[1, 2, 3], requires a-priori assump-
tions of available behavioral options and of a decision
making mechanism, followed by subsequent analysis of
evolutionary optimal behavior. For instance, a combat
for mating opportunities or territorial possession can be
modeled by the War of Attrition game[4, 5]: competitors
decide whether to retreat or pursue the fighting under
time increasing cost for competition. An alternative de-
scription is a strategy choice game, such as Hawk-Dove,
with options for selfish (Hawk) and cooperative (Dove)
behaviors. Evolutionary payoffs for possible outcomes of
the contest (retreat vs. pursue, Hawk vs. Dove etc.)
define evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS), capable of
outperforming any other behavior. In the case of War of
Attrition, for instance, evolutionarily stable strategy is to
pursue fighting with a probability exponentially decaying
with time. The notion of evolutionarily stable behavior
stems from game theoretical Nash equilibrium[6], though
may significantly deviate from it in interactions contain-
ing significant information exchange[7].
Predictions of animal behavior by its evolutionary sta-
bility are, in some cases, ambiguous and paradoxical.
There is a longstanding argument concerning emergence
and maintenance of cooperation or even altruism, which
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are apparently in discord with the Darwinian ban to in-
crease fitness of others[8, 9]. For instance, contrary to the
evolutionarily stable strategy for War of Attrition, non-
exponential statistics of combat durations takes place in
some species. The models, therefore, lack the ability to
account for the variety of behavioral strategies in nature.
Back in 1983, S. Austad proposed the combat of male
bowl and doily spider (Frontinella pyramitela) as a quan-
titative test of evolutionary game theory[10]. In nature,
mature males of this species wander in search of female
webs with eggs to fertilize and determine their evolution-
ary success by fighting with other males. The contests
end when one of the combatants gains access to the eggs
while his opponent either retreats or dies. The statistics
of fight outcomes (percentage of fatal injuries) together
with expected evolutionary payoffs (average eggs per fe-
male) were accurately documented.
One can expect a self-consistent evolutionary theory
predicting spiders’ behavior in a given fight from the ex-
pected number of eggs per female and from lifetime male
reproductive success: mortal combat becomes more rea-
sonable if a future evolutionary gain is unlikely. In lab-
oratory conditions, two virgin spiders of the same size
with no previous knowledge of females’ value, finish their
fight in 67% of cases by death of one of the competitors.
The surviving looser gets less than δ = 5% of eggs. Ac-
cording to field data, average value of a female is VF = 10
eggs and the male’s lifetime reproductive success in the
absence of fighting costs is VL = 16.2 eggs.
The main impediment to derive the spider’s observ-
able behavior from the corresponding evolutionary pay-
offs is the lack of a general theory for biological cogni-
tive processes. Assumption of random choice by a spider
whether to retreat or continue the fight leads to a fal-
lacious conclusion that sometimes they do not fight at
all. Hypothesis of war of attrition (fight until one of the
competitors retreats) predicts much shorter fight dura-
tions than observed[10]. It indicates that even natural
seeming assumptions, such as the skill to recognize a re-
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2treating competitor, may be beyond the spiders abilities
and have to be incorporated in evolutionary models with
great caution.
In this work, the complex process of choosing either
selfish S (e.g. continue the fight) or cooperative C (e.g.
retreat) behavior is described by conditional probabilities
α and β, where α and 1 − α are respectively the proba-
bilities to choose cooperation C and selfish S behaviors
against the competitor’s unconditional selfish behavior S,
while β and 1− β are the probabilities to choose cooper-
ation C and selfish S behaviors against the competitor’s
unconditional cooperation behavior C. In this context,
α and β can be viewed as selfishness aversion and co-
operation attraction respectively. These two parameters
suffice to describe all four types of interactions: S vs. S,
S vs. C, C vs. S and C vs. C. This approach gener-
alizes previous works based on conditional description of
behavior[11, 12, 13, 14, 15] and eliminates any assump-
tions about specific decision making mechanism.
The conditional probabilities α and β can be derived
experimentally in two ways. A first, bottom-up ap-
proach, is to determine (αobserv, βobserv) from observable
field data Ωpq, the statistics of outcomes p vs. q in the
course of a competition (p, q ∈ {S,C}) (see Fig. 1). The
conditional probability αobserv to choose cooperation C
against the competitor’s unconditional selfish behavior S,
is the ratio between the unconditional probability ΩCS
(to be cooperative vs. selfish competitor) and the un-
conditional probability of the competitor to be selfish
ΩCS + ΩSS . Applying the same reasoning for βobserv one
obtains:
αobserv =
ΩCS
ΩCS + ΩSS
, βobserv =
ΩCC
ΩSC + ΩCC
. (1)
A second, top-down, approach derives the evolution-
arily stable behavior (αcalc, βcalc) from observable payoff
values Wpq, for p vs. q interaction:
Wpq =
C S
C 1 c
S b 0
. (2)
This approach permits to calculate the αcalc and βcalc
parameters only in cases where no symmetrical coopera-
tion ΩCC = 0 or symmetrical selfishness ΩSS = 0 exist
(see Methods). For the case ΩCC = 0 one obtains:
αcalc =
c
b
, βcalc = 0 (3)
where for ΩSS = 0:
αcalc = 1, βcalc =
b− c
1− c . (4)
No prediction based solely on statistics of interactions
can be made for other cases. To be self-consistent, any
evolutionary explanation of behavior has to achieve a rea-
sonable match between the values (αobserv, βobserv) and
(αcalc, βcalc).
In the case of the bowl and doily spider, the observed
interaction statistics are ΩSS = 0.67, ΩCC = 0, ΩSC =
ΩCS = 0.165, assuming that only selfish vs. selfish (67%)
interactions lead to death of one of the combatants. Fol-
lowing eq. (1), the corresponding observed conditional
probabilities are αobserv = 0.198 and βobserv = 0. The
derived payoff table from VF = 10, VL = 16.2 and δ = 5%
is (see Methods):
Wpq =
C S
C 1 0.44
S 1.55 0
, (5)
Following eq. (3), the corresponding calculated condi-
tional probabilities are αcalc = 0.286 and βcalc = 0 and
ΩSS = 0.55, ΩCC = 0, ΩSC = ΩCS = 0.225 (see eq.
(12)). An exact match between (αobserv, βobserv) and
(αcalc, βcalc) is achieved if the lifetime gain value is low-
ered to VL = 13.42. This correction seems reasonable
since the original estimation of VL = 16.2 did not take
into account naturally existing threats such as predators,
etc[10].
The analysis of this work is sufficient to derive a self
consistent link between evolutionary payoffs Wpq and be-
havior characteristics which depend solely on outcomes
statistics Ωpq. For instance, mutual information ex-
change between competitors I is such a characteristic[15],
with a calculated value of I = 0.047 bits (out of a maxi-
mum of 1 bit describing a binary interaction) (see Meth-
ods, eq. (18)). It indicates a low level of communication
between fighting males. Only the link between payoffs
and Ωpq depending phenomena may be universal. Other
observable parameters, such as duration of fight[10, 16],
can not be predicted in the framework of this work and
are in general species’ specific.
One can derive the payoff table Wpq (2) from observ-
able statistics of interaction outcomes Ωpq, even when
direct measurement of the payoffs is impossible. When
the observed interaction statistics lack symmetrical co-
operation or selfish interactions (ΩCC = 0 or ΩSS = 0)
then the values of corresponding payoffs follow from eqs.
(3) and (4) respectively, using (αobserv, βobserv) (1) in-
stead of (αcalc, βcalc). But for cases where ΩCC 6= 0 and
ΩSS 6= 0, the reconstruction of payoffs from statistics is
impossible (see Methods).
Evolutionarily stable behavior (αcalc, βcalc) follows
from known payoffs (2) using eqs. (3) and (4). The
corresponding results are presented in Fig. 2, where pay-
offs are separated in standard games[17, 18] of Leader
(b > c, c > 1), Battle of the Sexes (b < c, b > 1), Chicken
(b > 1, 0 < c < 1) and Prisoner’s dilemma (b > 1, c < 0).
Other evolutionarily stable behaviors corresponding to
the same payoffs may exist, since a general stability anal-
ysis is impossible for behaviors with either β 6= 0 or α 6= 1
(see Methods). The value β = 0, however, is the most
intuitive behavior for c < b, since it suggests always a
selfish behavior versus a cooperative competitor (if c > b
then α = 1 is the complementary case). One can hypoth-
esize, therefore, that the derived behavior (αcalc, βcalc) is
3stable and unique in a majority of real world interactions.
Applying this reasoning to the problem of predator in-
spection by stickleback fish[19], we can argue that stick-
lebacks do not play the games of Chicken, Leader or Bat-
tle of the Sexes, since the observed ΩCC = 0.207, ΩSS =
0.621 ΩSC = ΩCS = 0.086 (leading to (αobserv = 0.121
and βobserv = 0.708), see eq. (1)) are not negligible (see
Supplementary Material (SM)). It supports indirectly the
conclusions that Prisoner’s dilemma is the most probable
type of the corresponding interaction and highlights the
importance of communication in the course of the preda-
tor inspection process[9]. Mutual information exchange
of sticklebacks eq. (18) is I = 0.24 bits, five times greater
than that of the bowl and doily spiders. According to the
work, additional information concerning processes of mu-
tual communication must be taken into account to derive
a corresponding payoff table.
The developed method allows to analyze the main
properties of behavior even in the case when exact statis-
tics of interaction are unknown. For instance, in the case
of territory defense by female lions[20] specific individuals
(leaders) cooperatively invest in territory defense, while
laggards selfishly avoid risk of fighting. The individual
role develops early in life and persists into adulthood.
A leader cooperatively takes a significant personal risk
even when she recognizes the lagging behavior of others.
On a speculative level, one can suggest that the uncon-
ditional cooperation stems from development of evolu-
tionarily stable behavior characterized by solitary acts of
cooperation ΩCS ,ΩSC 6= 0, with subsequent degradation
of the ability to change roles. Such development requires
payoffs corresponding to Chicken, Leader or Battle of the
Sexes games.
From a game theoretical perspective, the evolution-
arily stable behavior conditions (3) and (4) correspond
to a new type of game equilibrium. Whereas the Nash
equilibrium[6] does not consider the possibility of com-
munication between players (thus taking into account
only uncorrelated responses (mixed strategies)), and
correlated[21]/communication[22, 23] equilibria consider
only fixed information exchange mechanisms, our ap-
proach assumes that information exchange mechanisms
and behaviors co-evolve, eventually reaching together a
stable state. It applies to evolving interactions where the
competitors observe each other and exchange information
mutually[9].
To conclude, evolutionary payoffs are demonstrated to
follow unequivocally from observable statistics of interac-
tions lacking symmetrical cooperation or selfishness. The
results are verified by using known payoffs and interac-
tion statistics of male combat in bowl and doily spider.
In addition, the impossibility to derive payoffs from ob-
servations is demonstrated in the case of coexisting acts
of mutual cooperation and selfishness. These results may
explain solitary acts of cooperation as in the case of terri-
torial defense by lions and support Prisoner’s dilemma as
the main model for predator inspection by sticklebacks.
The correspondence of the derived and observed behav-
iors supports the possible existence of a unified game the-
oretical framework for animal behavior[7].
I. METHODS
A. Evolutionarily stable points
To derive eqs. (3) and (4), one should find for each pay-
off table Wpq an evolutionarily stable behavior (αst, βst),
that outperforms any other behavior (mutant) m, char-
acterized by (αm, βm):
G(αst, βst|αst, βst) > G(αm, βm|αst, βst), (6)
where G(αi, βi|αj , βj) is the gain of an individual (αi, βi)
interacting with (αj , βj). On the boundary of the (α, β)
space (α = 0, α = 1, β = 0 or β = 1), the stable values
(αst, βst) correspond to the maxima of the gain in the
tangential direction to the boundary:
∂G(αi, βi|αj , βj)
∂xi
∣∣∣∣αi,j=αst
βi,j=βst
= 0, (7)
∂2G(αi, βi|αj , βj)
∂x2i
∣∣∣∣αi,j=αst
βi,j=βst
< 0, (8)
where xi denotes either αi or βi (e.g. if β = 0 then the
tangential direction xi is αi). Mutants along perpendic-
ular direction do not affect the values (αst, βst) though
may make the corresponding behavior to be unstable (see
SM, Fig. 3).
The gain G(αi, βi|αj , βj) is determined by the proba-
bilities Ωpq of an interaction p vs. q, and by the corre-
sponding payoffs Wpq, G =
∑
ΩpqWpq:
G(αi, βi|αj , βj) = ΩCC + cΩCS + bΩSC , (9)
taking eq. (2) into account.
In the course of an interaction between individuals
(αi, βi) and (αj , βj), the probabilities Ωpq are determined
by a system of equations analogous to eq. (1)):
αi =
ΩCS
ΩCS + ΩSS
, αj =
ΩSC
ΩSS + ΩSC
,
βi =
ΩCC
ΩSC + ΩCC
, βj =
ΩCC
ΩCC + ΩCS
,
ΩSS + ΩSC + ΩCS + ΩCC = 1. (10)
This system, comprising 5 equations for 4 variables, is
solvable for five distinct cases only: if the competitors are
identical and on the boundaries of (α, β) space. The cor-
responding solution for identical competitors (αi, βi) =
(αj , βj) = (α, β) is:
ΩCC =
αβ
1− β + α, ΩSS =
(1− α)(1− β)
1− β + α ,
ΩCS = ΩSC =
α(1− β)
1− β + α,
(11)
4Second, if they are on the β = 0 boundary (βi = βj = 0):
ΩCC = 0, ΩSS =
(1− αi)(1− αj)
1− αiαj ,
ΩCS =
αi(1− αj)
1− αiαj , ΩSC =
αj(1− αi)
1− αiαj ,
(12)
Third, if they are on the α = 1 boundary (αi = αj = 1):
ΩCC =
βiβj
βi + βj − βiβj , ΩSS = 0,
ΩCS =
βi(1− βj)
βi + βj − βiβj , ΩSC =
βj(1− βi)
βi + βj − βiβj ,
(13)
Fourth, (αi = αj = 0): ΩSS = 1, ΩSC = ΩCS = ΩCC =
0. Fifth, (βi = βj = 1): ΩCC = 1, ΩSC = ΩCS = ΩSS =
0.
Eqs. (3) and (4) for (αst, βst) follow from eqs. (7)
and (9) using (12) and (13) respectively. This derivation
considerers the mutants along the boundaries only (see
SM, Fig. 3). No specific (αst, βst) exists in the fourth
and fifth cases (α = 0 and β = 1 boundaries), since the
corresponding Ωpq are independent of α and β.
A general stability analysis of particular behavior
(α, β) is impossible. It requires analysis of host vs. mu-
tant interactions that can not be described by conditional
probabilities (α, β). For instance, when mutants leave the
boundary, the system of eqs. (10) is unsolvable. In case
of the bowl and doily spider the stability of behavior at
(α = 0.286, β = 0) along the β axis is justified mainly by
observation (see SM, Fig. 3). Stability of behavior along
α axis can be justified only by simulation of population
dynamics (see SM), since the stability condition (8) van-
ishes for the gain (9) in the cases described by statistics
(12) and (13), with behaviors (3) and (4) respectively.
B. Reduction of payoff table Wpq to two parameter
b and c form
The payoffs of biological organisms competing for a
resource with value VF , and possessing lifetime gain VL
are:
C S
C WCC WCS
S WSC WSS
=
C S
C VF /2 VF δ
S VF (1− δ) VF /2− VL/2
, (14)
where each of them receives VF /2 in case of mutual co-
operation, VF /2−VL/2 for mutual selfishness (assuming
that it leads to the death of one of the combatants), while
VF δ and VF (1−δ) are the shares of interacting selfish and
cooperative competitors respectively.
Reduction of the payoff table (14) to its two parameters
form (2) requires two transformations:
W ′pq = Wpq −WSS , (15)
and
W ′′pq = W
′
pq/(W
′
CC −W ′SS). (16)
Consequently, the parameters b and c in (2) are:
b =
WSC −WSS
WCC −WSS ,
c =
WCS −WSS
WCC −WSS . (17)
These transformation do no affect the stability conditions
(7) and (8) (see SM).
Eq. (5) follows substituting VF = 10, VL = 16.2 and
δ = 5% to eqs. (14 and (17).
C. Information calculation
Mutual information per interaction is given by[15]:
I(α, β) = log2
(
(1− α)(1−α)γ(1− β)(1−β)(1−γ)ααγββ(1−γ)
γγ(1− γ)γ
)
,
(18)
where:
γ =
1− β
1 + α− β . (19)
For spiders I = 0.047 bits, substituting (α =
0.198, β = 0) in eq. (18). The same result for stickle-
backs is I = 0.24 bits, (α = 0.121, β = 0.708).
II. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
A. Solution of system (10)
The system of eqs. (10) can be represented as:
α1 0 α1 − 1 0
α2 α2 − 1 0 0
0 β1 0 β1 − 1
0 0 β2 β2 − 1
1 1 1 1

 ΩSSΩSCΩCS
ΩCC
 =

0
0
0
0
1
 .
(20)
A solution for this system exists if the determinant of the
corresponding extended matrix U vanishes:
detU = 0, (21)
where
U =

α1 0 α1 − 1 0 0
α2 α2 − 1 0 0 0
0 β1 0 β1 − 1 0
0 0 β2 β2 − 1 0
1 1 1 1 1
 . (22)
5For a general case there is no solution, since it includes
five equations and only four variables.
The determinant of U :
detU(α1, β1, α2, β2) =
α1(β1 − 1)β2 + α2(α1β2 − β1(α1 + β2 − 1)).
(23)
vanishes either in case of identical phenotypes (α1, β1) =
(α2, β2) or at the boundaries of the (α, β) space, α = 0, 1
or β = 0, 1. It can be demonstrated as follows:
detU(α, β, α, β) = 0, (24)
Then taking into account (24), α2 6= α1 fits (21) if:
∂ detU
∂α2
∣∣∣∣
α1,2=α,β1,2=β
= β(1− β), (25)
vanishes. The same holds for changes in β2:
∂ detU
∂β2
∣∣∣∣
α1,2=α,β1,2=β
= −α(1− α). (26)
The solutions (11), (12) and (13) can be checked by a
substitution.
B. Normalization
The transformations (15) and (16) do not affect the
stability condition (6). Taking into account that G =∑
ΩpqWpq, (6) becomes
∑
pq ∆ΩpqWpq ≤ 0:
∆ΩCCWCC + ∆ΩCSWCS + . . .
+ ∆ΩSCWSC + ∆ΩSSWSS ≤ 0. (27)
where ∆Ωpq =
(
Ωmpq − Ωstpq
)
.
Applying the first transformation (15) to (27) results
in:
∆ΩCCW ′CC + ∆ΩCSW
′
CS + . . .
+ ∆ΩSCW ′SC + ∆ΩSSW
′
SS + . . .
+ WSS
∑
pq
∆Ωpq ≤ 0. (28)
The last term in the left part vanishes (
∑
pq ∆Ωpq = 0)
preserving the form of condition (6). The second trans-
formation (16) converts (28) into
∑
pq ∆ΩpqW
′′
pq ≤ 0.
C. Stability analysis
Evolutionary stability of (αst, βst) (a solution of (7))
can be justified by population dynamics analysis, if the
corresponding condition (8) vanishes. The population
dynamics is described by the replicator dynamics equa-
tions [24]:
∂ρ(αi, βi)
∂t
=
1
Tgen
ρ(αi, βi)
F (αi, βi)− F
|F | , (29)
where ρ(αi, βi) the density of the behavior (αi, βi), Tgen
is the time span of a single generation and F (αi, βi) =∑
j ρ(αj , βj)G(αi, βi|αj , βj) is the evolutionary fitness
(average gain) of the phenotype (αi, βi). The average
fitness F in the population is F =
∑
i ρ(αi, βi)F (αi, βi).
In the case of bowl and doily spiders, convergence of a
population to α = 0.286 (corresponding to condition (3)
in case of payoffs (b = 1.556, c = 0.444)) is checked by
a simulation of replicator dynamics eq. (29) taking into
account gain (9), statistics (12) and prediction (3) (see
the attached animation). The same convergence holds
for all solutions (3) with payoffs (b, c) corresponding to
games of Chicken (b > 1, 0 < c < 1) and Leader (b >
c, c > 1).
The stability of β values corresponding to condition
(4) can be verified for the entire region of Battle of the
Sexes game (b < c, b > 1) using gain (9) with statistics
(13).
D. Calculation of Ωpq, α and β in case of predator
inspection by sticklebacks
M. Milinski checked the readiness of a single stickle-
back fish to inspect a predator (located in the front of a
pool) in presence of permanently cooperative or defecting
companion, which was simulated by a tilted mirror[19].
The ”cooperating mirror” was parallel to the pool, sim-
ulating a companion which followed immediately a pro-
ceeding stickleback. The ”defecting mirror” was tilted
to simulate a companion which stayed increasingly be-
hind a proceeding individual. The results which are
relevant for this work are[19]: ”With the cooperating
mirror the sticklebacks twice as often in the front half
(mean PC = 25.1%) as with the defecting mirror (mean
PS = 12.1%)”, where PC and PS are the probabilities
to observe a stickleback close to the predator in the ex-
periments with cooperative and defecting mirrors respec-
tively.
Associating predator inspection (going to the front half
of the pool) with cooperative behavior and taking into
account that in the case of a ”cooperating mirror” only
S vs. S or C vs. C interactions are observable, one ob-
tains:
ΩCC
ΩSS + ΩCC
= PC . (30)
The same applied to the case of ”defecting mirror”
(C vs. S or S vs. S interactions are observable) leads
to:
ΩCS
ΩSS + ΩCS
= PS , (31)
6where Ωpq are the probabilities of the outcomes in a hy-
pothetical experiment with two sticklebacks (rather than
a stickleback and a mirror) possessing the same (α, β).
To derive conditional probabilities (α, β) of a stickle-
back and corresponding interaction statistics Ωpq, sub-
stitution of PC = 0.251 and PS = 0.121 to eqs. (30),
(31) and (11) results in α = PS = 0.121 and β =
(1 − α)/(1 + 2α) = 0.708. The corresponding values
Ωpq following (11) are ΩCC = 0.207, ΩSS = 0.621 and
ΩSC = ΩCS = 0.086. As one can see, neither ΩCC nor
ΩSS are negligible in this case.
E. Lions defending their territory
Female lions defend the pride’s territory by approach-
ing a potential intruder and when necessary proceeding
to a fight[20]. To avoid risk of fighting ”certain indi-
viduals consistently lag behind their companions during
the group response”. The most surprising phenomenon
is that ”although leaders recognize laggards and behave
more cautiously in their presence, they continue to lead
the response”. The separation into selfish laggards and
cooperative leaders ”appears early in life and persists into
adulthood”.
In this case the reported observations are insufficient
to derive statistics of interaction outcomes Ωpq, where
laggard and leader are associated with selfish and coop-
erative behaviors respectively.
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7FIG. 1: From observed behavior to evolutionary payoffs and back. Animal interactions may be classified according to
the behavior of the competitors, using observable parameters such as level of aggression or cooperation. Four types of contests
exist when the individual behavior is either selfish S or cooperative C (S vs. S, S vs. C, C vs. S and C vs. C). Continuous
observations of such competitions provide Ωpq, the probabilities of p vs. q interactions (p, q ∈ {S,C}). The statistics Ωpq
defines individual behavior parameters αobserv and βobserv, the conditional probabilities to be cooperative against selfish and
cooperative competitors respectively. The corresponding Darwinian payoffs may be determined by analysis of evolutionary
stability of the observed behavior. When payoffs are known, one can predict evolutionarily stable behavior (αcalc, βcalc) and
compare it with the observed one (αobserv, βobserv). Animals with documented statistics of interactions and payoffs, such as
the bowl and doily spiders, provide an ultimate test for evolutionary theory.
8FIG. 2: Darwinian payoffs and corresponding evolutionarily stable behavior. Darwinian payoffs b and c (2) are
generally presented as model games of Leader (b > c, c > 1), Battle of the Sexes (b < c, b > 1), Chicken (b > 1, 0 < c < 1)
and Prisoner’s dilemma (b > 1, c < 0). For each values b and c the corresponding prediction of evolutionarily stable behavior
(α, β) is indicated. Chicken and Leader games cause unconditional selfishness against cooperative competitors (β = 0, with
corresponding ΩCC = 0). Battle of the Sexes leads to permanent cooperation against selfishness (α = 1, with corresponding
ΩSS = 0). No predictions can be made for other cases, since stability analysis of the corresponding (α, β) parameters requires
previous knowledge of some difficult to observe interaction characteristics, such as information exchange, the order of mutual
responses etc.
9FIG. 3: Evolutionary stability of behavior (α, β). Evolutionarily stable behavior (α, β) has to outperform any possible
mutant. In the (α, β) space only interactions between individuals on the same boundary can be analyzed (β = 0 with
corresponding ΩCC = 0, α = 1 with ΩSS = 0, β = 1 with ΩCC = 1, α = 0 with ΩSS = 1). Convergence of a population
towards its stable position can be analyzed only along the boundaries (solid arrows). Mutants along the boundary will converge
towards the stable point, while dynamics of mutants outside the boundary (dashed arrows) can not be generally analyzed.
These mutants do not affect the position of the stable point on the boundary.
